Abstract. We present an efficient secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access provision, named SePCAR. The protocol is fully decentralised and allows users to share their cars conveniently in such a way that the security and privacy of the users is not sacrificed. It provides generation, update, revocation, and distribution mechanisms for access tokens to shared cars, as well as procedures to solve disputes and to deal with law enforcement requests, for instance in the case of car incidents. We prove that SePCAR meets its appropriate security and privacy requirements and that it is efficient: our practical efficiency analysis through a proof-of-concept implementation shows that SePCAR takes only 1.55 seconds for a car access provision.
Introduction
As opposed to the traditional car ownership, the idea of car sharing, which allows users to share their cars conveniently, is gaining popularity. Statistics have shown that the worldwide number of users for car sharing services has grown from 2012 to 2014 by 170% (4.94 million) [1] [2] [3] [4] with a tendency to increase by 2021 [5] . With the use of portable devices and in-vehicle telematics, physical car keys are slowly becoming obsolete. Keyless car Sharing Systems (KSSs) allow car owners to rather use their portable devices such as smartphones to distribute temporary digital car keys (access tokens) to other users and several car manufacturers (including Volvo [6] , BMW [7] and Toyota [8] ) have started investing in such systems. Moreover, unlike traditional car rental companies, KSSs can provide a relatively inexpensive alternative to users who need a car occasionally and ondemand [9] . The use of KSSs can also contribute to a decrease in the number of cars, effectively reducing CO 2 emissions [10] and the need for parking space [11] .
In spite of these advantages, information collection in car sharing systems does not only jeopardise a system's security, but also the users' privacy. Uber used a tool called "Hell" to spy on their rival company drivers [12] , whereas their mobile app always tracks their users' locations [13] . In short, an adversary may try to eavesdrop and collect information exchanged within the KSS, tamper with the car sharing details, extract the key of a car stored in untrusted devices, generate a rogue access token to maliciously access a car or to deny having accessed a car. Regarding users' privacy, an adversary may try to correlate and link two car sharing requests for the same user or the car, to identify which user used which car and deduce the users' sharing preferences. These preferences can be established by collecting information about sharing patterns such as rental time, duration, pickup location, when, where and with whom someone is sharing a car. An adversary may even attempt to infer sensitive information about users such as racial and religious beliefs [14] or their health status, by identifying users who use cars for disabled passengers or visit hospitals regularly. Sensitive personal data are related to fundamental rights and freedoms, and merit protection regarding the collection and processing as it is articulated in the new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [15] . A KSS may further introduce various other concerns with respect to connectivity issues [4] , car key revocations in case users' device is stolen [16, 17] , and the fact that malicious users may attempt to manipulate or even completely destroy potential forensic evidence on the car or their devices.
A naive way to mitigate the security and privacy concerns is to implement a peer-to-peer protocol between both the users and the car. The car owner can generate a temporary access token for her car using the car key and distribute it to the other user, the consumer, who can use the token to access the car. This approach has two main limitations: (i) the owner and the consumer may not trust each other, thus affecting the accountability of the system, and (ii) the owner has to have a copy of the car key on her personal device which is prone to get lost or stolen. These limitations can be overcome by having a centralised entity, which is trusted by both users, to perform the access token generation on behalf of the car owner. However, such a centralised entity will have to be fully trusted, which might not be realistic under real world scenarios. It can jeopardise the users' privacy as it will have access to users' booking details and car keys.
Our Contributions. We design a concrete and fully decentralised secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access povision, named SePCAR. The protocol provides generation and distribution of access tokens for car access provision, as well as update and revocation operations used for facilitating mutually agreed modifications of the booking details and protecting against misbehaving consumers, respectively. It internally uses secure multiparty computation to facilitate forensic evidence provision in case of car incidents or at the request of law enforcement. SePCAR is described in detail in Section 4.
We prove that the protocol fulfils the desired security and privacy requirements bound to the standards of connected cars. First, departing from Symeonidis et al. [18] , we give a detailed list of security and privacy requirements in Section 2. Then, in Section 5, we prove that SePCAR meets its security and privacy requirements as long as its underlying cryptographic primitives (listed in Section 3) are secure.
Our theoretical complexity and practical efficiency analysis in Section 6 demonstrates SePCAR's competitiveness. In particular, we implemented a prototype as a proof-of-concept in C ++ and we achieved a car access provision in ≈ 1.55 seconds.
Related Work. Enev et al. [19] showed that it is possible to reach high identification rates of drivers, from 87% to 99% accuracy, based on data collected by the Fig. 1 . System model of a physical Keyless car Sharing System (KSS) [18] .
sensors of a car from 15 minutes of open-road driving. Troncoso et al. [20] proposed a pay-as-you-drive scheme that enhances the location privacy of drivers by sending only aggregated data to insurance companies. Balasch et al. [21] proposed an electronic toll pricing protocol where a car's on-board unit calculates locally the driver's annual toll fee while disclosing a minimum amount of location information. To mitigate colluding (dishonest) users, Floriat et al. [22] presented a privacy-preserving spot checking protocol that allows observations in public spaces. Mustafa et al. [23] proposed an anonymous electric vehicle charging protocol with billing support. The EVITA [24] and PRESERVE [25, 26] are designated projects on the design and specifications of the secure architecture of on-board units of cars. Driven by the PRESERVE instantiation, Raya et al. [27] described the need for Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI), and Khodaei et al. [28] proposed a generic pseudonymization approach aiming to preserve the unlinkability of messages exchanged between vehicles and VPKI servers. None of these solutions provides a full-fledged keyless car sharing system, though.
Dmitrienko and Plappert [4] designed a secure two-factor authentication protocol using mobile platforms and RFID tags, e.g., smart-cards. However, in contrast to our solution, their protocol assumes a fully trusted car sharing provider which has access to the master key of smart-cards and also collects and stores all the information exchanged between the car provider and their users for every car access provision.
System Model and Requirements
In this section, we describe the system model and functionalities of a KSS. Moreover, we specify the threat model, the security, privacy and functional requirements which it needs to satisfy and the assumptions we will use. System Model. We follow the KSS system model of Symeonidis et al. [18] . See also Figure 1 . Users are individuals who are willing to share their cars, owners (u o ), and use cars which are available for sharing, consumers (u c ), with the use of Portable Devices (PDs) such as smartphones. An On-Board Unit (OBU) is an embedded or a standalone hardware/software component [29] which is part of the secure access management system of a car. It has a wireless interface such as Bluetooth, NFC or LTE. The Car manufacturer (CM) is responsible for generating and embedding a digital key into each car. These keys are used for car sharing and are stored in the manufacturers' Database (DB). The Keyless Sharing Management System (KSMS) is a complex of multiparty computation (MPC) servers that assists owners with a car access token generation, distribution, update and revocation. Each server individually retrieves its share of the car key, K car , and the servers jointly encrypt the booking details, M B , to generate an access token, AT car . The access token is published on a Public Ledger (PL), which serves as a public bulletin board that guarantees the integrity of the data [30] . The booking details are typically agreed upon by owner and consumer prior to the beginning of the protocol.
Threat Model. Within the KSS the KSMS, the CM, and the PL are considered honest-but-curious entities. They will perform the protocol honestly, but they are curious to extract private information about users. Owners are passive adversaries while consumers and outsiders may be malicious. The car's OBU is trusted and equipped with Hardware Security Module (HSM) [25, 31] Assumptions. For SePCAR, we assume that before every evaluation, the booking details are agreed upon by owner and consumer, but that both keep these booking details confidential against external parties. SePCAR relies on PKI infrastructure [11, 25, 28] , and we assume that each entity has her private/public key pair with their corresponding digital certificates distributed authentically. The communication channels are secure and authenticated among entities using SSL-TLS and NFC. For an OBU, it is reasonable to assume that the cost for any adversary to perform a physical attack while renting a car is higher than the adversary's capabilities due to the presence of the HSM [25, 31] . The MPC servers are held by non-colluding organisations, i.e., organisations with conflicting interests such as authorities, owner unions and car manufacturers.
Cryptographic Building Blocks

Cryptographic Functionalities
SePCAR uses the following cryptographic building blocks. The suggested instantiations are the ones used in our proof-of-concept implementation.
-σ ← sign(Sk, m) and true/false ← verify(P k, m, σ) are public key operations for signing and verification respectively. These can be implemented using RSA. -z ← prf(K, counter) is a pseudorandom function (PRF) using as input a key and a counter. This function can be implemented using CTR mode with AES (as the message input is small). -c ← enc(P k, m) and m ← dec(Sk, c) are public key encryption and decryption functions. These can be implemented using RSA. -c ← E(K, m) and m ← D(K, c) are symmetric key encryption and decryption functions. These can be implemented using CTR mode with AES.
is a symmetric key MAC function. This function can be implemented using CBC-MAC with AES.
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-z ← hash(m) is a cryptographic hash function. This function can be implemented using SHA-2.
We will furthermore use the notation z ← query(x, y) to denote the retrieval of the xth value from the yth database DB (to be defined in Section 4), and z ← query an(y) to denote the retrieval of the yth value from the public ledger PL through an anonymous communication channel such as Tor [33] , aiming to anonymously retrieve a published record submitted using the publish(y) function.
Multiparty Computation
Ben-or et al. [34] (commonly referred to as BGW) and Chaum et al. [35] proved that it is possible to calculate any function with perfect security in the presence of active and passive adversaries under the information-theoretic model, as long as there is an honest majority: 1/2 for passive and 2/3 for active adversaries. The former can be achieved by assuming the use of private channels among the servers and the latter using Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS). Our protocol is MPC-agnostic, meaning that it does not depend on the solution that implements the MPC functionality, and example protocols that could be executed within our protocol are SPDZ [36] , BDOZ [37] and MASCOT [38] . However, the three-party protocol for Boolean circuits that was recently introduced by Araki et al. [39] is fairly suited for our current needs, given its performance and threshold properties. Thus, this is the protocol we use in our simulation. It can perform non-linear operations with relatively high throughput and somewhat low latency (when tested on 10 Gbps connections). The scheme provides threshold security against semi-honest parties. Note that Furukawa et al. [40] further adapt the protocol to provide security against a malicious adversary.
On an incremental setup for KSMS. In essence, our protocol can support an incremental setup and deployment where an (l > 2)-case of KSMS servers is trivial, e.g., using BGW [34] . The 2-party case setting could also be trivially achieved by using l-party MPC protocols such as SPDZ [36] , however, the forensic properties of our setup would no longer be attainable.
Multiparty Computation Functionalities. SePCAR uses the following cryptographic functionalities for MPC:
-[x] ← share(x) is used to secretly share an input. This function can be instantiated using Araki et al.'s sharing functionality.
) reconstructs the private input based on the secret shares. . This is equivalent to computing
) secretly computes a symmetric encryption from a secret shared key [K] and a secret shared message [M ] . Several protocols have been proposed to achieve this, e.g., [41, 42] . We include a succinct review on how to implement AES below.
) secretly computes a MAC from a secret shared key [K] and a secret shared message [M ]. 
The matched (eqz output) yth car key ( Ciphertext (enc output) of session keys
Time-stamp of uc accessing the shared car, a record published (publish) on the PL submitted by Si
3.2 AT car , ID car 4. Auth. On the secure equality test. Various protocols have been proposed to implement the equality tests (previously referred eqz functionality). Common approaches provide either constant rounds or a logarithmic number of them on the bit size of its inputs, which could be proven more efficient for sufficiently small sizes. Furthermore, they also offer different security levels, i.e., perfect or statistical security. We refer the reader to the constructions presented in [43] [44] [45] for further details on their implementation and inner working. We assume the use of logarithmic depth comparison circuits.
On AES over MPC. AES has been the typical functionality used for benchmarking MPC protocols during the last few years. This and its usability on MPC based applications have motivated faster and leaner MPC implementations of the cipher. As it was previously stated, they consider the case where the computational parties hold a secret shared key K and a secret shared message M . The product of the operation is a secret shared AES encrypted ciphertext. We refer the reader to [42, [46] [47] [48] for further details and treatment on the state of the art. Note that in this paper we assume the use of Damgård and Keller [46] with some minor code optimisations.
SePCAR
In this section, we provide a detailed description of SePCAR. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider a single owner, consumer and a shared car. The description straightforwardly scales to a larger set of owners, consumers, and cars. Table 1 lists the notation used in the paper and Fig: 2 illustrates the high-level overview of SePCAR.
SePCAR consists of four steps: session keys generation and data distribution, access token generation, access token distribution and verification and car access. We will discuss these steps in detail in the remainder of the section, with a general overview picture given in Figure 8 in Appendix A. Before discussing these steps, we first discuss a few prerequisite steps which have to be performed. After the discussion of the fourth (and last) step, we complete the section with an overview of the possible operations after SePCAR: access token update and revocation.
Prerequisite. Before SePCAR can commence, two prerequisite steps need to take place: car key distribution and setting the details for the car booking.
Car key distribution takes place immediately after the xth owner, ID . Car booking allows u o and u c to agree on the booking details, i.e.,
car is the pick-up location of the car, CD uc is the set of conditions under which u c is allowed to use the car (e.g., restrictions on locations, time period), AC uc are the access control rights under which u c is allowed to access the car and ID B is the booking identifier. Recall that it is assumed that an owner and a consumer agree on the booking details beforehand.
Step 1: Session Keys Generation and Data Distribution. u c generates two symmetric session keys, K 
Step 1: session keys generation and data distribution.
to encrypt the access token, such that only u c has access to it. K uc 2 will be used to generate an authentication tag which will allow u c to verify that the access token contains M B which was agreed upon during the car booking. In addition, u o sends the necessary data to each S i , such that the access token can be generated. In detail, as it is shown in Figure 4 , u o sends a session-keys-generation request, SES K GEN REQ, along with ID B to u c . Upon receipt of the request, u c generates K Step 2: Access Token Generation. The servers generate an access token and publish it on the PL. In detail, as it is shown in Figure 5 , upon receipt of AT GEN REQ from u o , each S i uses the ID uo to extract [K car ] from DB Si as follows. Initially, each S i uses ID uo to retrieve the list of identities of all cars and car key shares related to the set of records that correspond to u o . The result is stored in a vector D uo of size n × 3, i.e.,
where n is the number of cars which u o has registered with the KSS.
Public Ledger (PL)
Step 2: access token generation.
To retrieve the record for the car to be shared, each
and performs a comparison with each of the n records of D uo using the eqz() function. The comparison outcomes 0 for mismatch and 1 for identifying the car at position y. The result of each iteration is stored in a vector D car with size 1 × n, i.e., Step 3: Access Token Verification and Distribution. The PL publishes the shares of the encrypted access token which are then retrieved by u c . Once retrieved, u c can obtain the access token and use it to access the car. In detail, as it is shown in Figure 6 , upon receipt of AT PUB REQ, PL publishes [C B ], [C uc ] and T S P ub , which is the time-stamp of publishing the encrypted token. Then PL sends an acknowledgement of publication, AT PUB ACK, along with T S P ub i to at least one S i which forwards it to u o who, in turn, forwards it to u c . Upon receipt of AT PUB ACK, u c uses T S msg{AT P U B ACK, T S
Step 3: access token distribution and verification.
Step 4: Car Access. The consumer uses the access token to obtain access to the car. In detail, u c sends {AT car , ID car , Cert uc } to the car using a secure and close range communication channel such as NFC or Bluetooth (see Figure 7) . 
Security and Privacy Analysis
We prove that SePCAR satisfies the security and privacy requirements of Section 2, provided that its underlying cryptographic primitives are sufficiently secure. Below theorem statement and proof are informal; a formal description of the security models and the proof will be given in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 1. If communication takes place over private channels, the MPC is statistically secure,
-the signature scheme sign is multi-key existentially unforgeable [50] , -the pseudorandom function prf is multi-key secure [51] , -the public key encryption scheme enc is multi-key semantically secure [52] , -the symmetric key encryption scheme E is multi-key chosen-plaintext secure [53] , -the MAC function mac is multi-key existentially unforgeable [50] , and -the hash function hash is collision resistant [54] , then SePCAR fulfils the security and privacy requirements of Section 2.
Note that, indeed, for each of the keyed cryptographic primitives we require security in the multi-key setting, as these are evaluated under different keys. For example, sign is used by all owners, each with a different key; enc is used for different keys, each for a different party in the KSMS, and E and mac are used for independent keys for every fresh evaluation of the protocol. We refer to Bellare et al. [52] for a discussion on generalizing semantic security of public key encryption to multi-key security; the adaptation straightforwardly generalizes to the other security models.
Proof (sketch). We treat the security and privacy requirements, and discuss how these are achieved from the cryptographic primitives, separately. We recall that consumer and owner have agreed upon the booking details prior to the evaluation of SePCAR, hence they know each other.
SR1 -Confidentiality of M
B . In one evaluation of the protocol, u c , u o , and the shared car learn the booking details by default or design. The KSMS servers only learn shares of the booking data, and under the assumption that the MPC is statistically secure, nothing about the booking data is revealed during the MPC. The outcomes of the MPC are C B and C uc satisfying
both of which reveal nothing about M B to a malicious outsider due to the assumed security of mac, E, and the independent uniform drawing of the keys K 
SR2 -Authenticity of M
B . An owner who initiates the access token generation and distribution, first signs the booking details using its private key before sending those to the KSMS in shares. Therefore, once the car receives the token and obtains the booking details, it can verify the owner's signature on the booking details. In other words, the car can verify the source of the booking details, the owner and their integrity. Suppose, to the contrary, that a malicious consumer can get access to a car of an owner u o . This particularly means that it created a tuple (M B , σ uo ) such that verify(P k uo , M B , σ uo ) holds. If σ uo is new, this means that u c forges a signature for the secret signing key Sk uo . This is impossible by assumption that the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable. On the other hand, if (M B , σ uo ) is old but the evaluation is fresh, this means a collision hash(Cert uc ) = hash(Cert uc ), which happens with negligible probability as hash is collision resistant.
SR3 -Confidentiality of AT
car . The access token is generated by the KSMS servers obliviously (as the MPC is statistically secure), and only revealed to the public in encrypted form, through C uc of (2). Due to the uniform drawing of the key K uc 1 , only the legitimate user can decrypt and learn the access token. It shares it with the car over a secure and private channel.
SR4 -Confidentiality of K
car . Only the car manufacturer and the car itself hold copies of the car key. The KSMS servers learn these in shared form, hence learn nothing about it by virtue of the statistical security of the MPC. Retrieving a car key from encryptions made under this key constitutes a key recovery attack, which in turn allows to break the chosen-plaintext security of the symmetric key encryption scheme.
SR5 -Backward and forward secrecy of AT
car . The access token is published on the public ledger as C uc of (2), encrypted under symmetric key K uc 1 . Every honest consumer generates a fresh key K uc 1 for every new evaluation, using a pseudorandom function prf that is secure, i.e., that is indistinguishable from a random function. This implies that all session keys are drawn independent and uniformly at random. In addition, the symmetric encryption scheme E is multikey secure. Concluding, all encryptions C uc are independent and reveal nothing of each other. (Note that nothing can be said about access tokens for malicious users who may deviate from the protocol and reuse one-time keys.) PR1 -Unlinkability of u c and the car. The only consumer-identifiable data is in the consumer's certificate included in the booking details. Note that these are agreed upon between the consumer and the owner, so the owner learns the identity of the consumer by default. Beyond that, the consumer only communicates with the car, which is supposed to learn the consumer's identity so that it can perform proper access control. The consumer consults the public ledger over an anonymous channel. The booking details are transferred to and from the KSMS, but these are encrypted and do not leak by virtue of their confidentiality (security requirement SR1).
PR2 -Anonymity of u c and the car. The reasoning is identical to that of PR1.
PR3 -Undetectability of AT
car operation. Access token generation, update, or revocation is performed using the same steps and the same type of messages sent to the KSMS and PL. Hence, outsiders and system entities can not distinguish which operation has been requested.
PR4 -Forensic evidence provision. In the case of disputes, the information related to a specific transaction (and only this information) may need to be reconstructed. This reconstruction can be done only if the KSMS servers collude and reveal their shares. In our setting, these servers have competing interests, thus they would not collude unless law authorities enforce them to do so. Due to the properties of threshold secret sharing, the private inputs can be reconstructed by a majority coalition. This is, if the KSMS consists of three parties, it suffices two of such parties to reconstruct the secrets (for semi-honest and malicious cases).
FR1 -Offline authentication. Note that steps 1-3 of the protocol require a network connection, but step 4, car access, is performed using close range communication and with no need of a network connection. The decryption and verification of the access token can be performed by the car offline (it has its key K car and the owner's public key P k uo stored). Sending the confirmation signature σ car Access can also be done offline.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide a theoretical complexity and practical efficiency analysis of SePCAR.
Theoretical Complexity. The complexity of multiparty protocols is typically measured by the number of communication rounds produced by non-linear operations, as linear operations can usually be done without any information exchange and are virtually free of charge. We refer the reader to [55] for an extended review on complexity analysis on MPC. In one evaluation of SePCAR, the nonlinear operations performed by the KSMS servers are (i) the retrieval of the car key by means of using multiple calls of the eqz functionality using the ID car and their counterparts in D car as parameters, and (ii) two evaluations of the encryption scheme E and one evaluation of mac.
For (i) the evaluations of the eqz functionality, we consider a multiplicative depth of log(|ID car |) + 1, where |ID car | is the amount of bits in ID car . Note that we can parallelize the eqz call for all D car entries. Therefore, the bulk of the overhead of extracting the car key comes from implementing the equality test in logarithmic depth [44] . Besides executing the eqz tests, we also have to perform an extra communication round since we need to multiply the result of each equality test with its corresponding car key. The total number of communication rounds for (i) is thus log(|ID car |) + 1. For (ii) the two evaluations of the encryption scheme E and the single evaluation of mac we use, as mentioned in Section 3, CTR mode with AES and CBC-MAC with AES, respectively. Note that in a single AES evaluation the number of non-linear operations equals the number of S-Boxes evaluated in these functions, but many can be parallelized. Denote by ν the number of communication rounds needed to encrypt a single 128-bit block using AES. The two evaluations of CTR mode can be performed in parallel, and cost 2 · ν rounds. The evaluation of CBC-MAC is inherently sequential and costs
The total amount of communication rounds can thus be expressed as
Practical Efficiency. Our protocol, as well as above computation, is agnostic towards the underlying multiparty protocol. In our experiments we have incorporated the 3-party semi-honest protocol by Araki et al. [39] , given its relative efficiency of AES calls compared to alternatives such as Sharemind [56] and others [57] [58] [59] . The upshot of our experiments is that SePCAR needs only 1.55 seconds for a car access provision. We elaborate on our simulation below, following the steps of Section 4. A detailed segregation of the time into the different steps is given in Table 2 .
Step 1. Recall that step 1 handles the preparation and sharing of the booking details and generation of keys. For enc we use RSA with 2048 bit keys (≈ 2ms) and for sign we use RSA with SHA-2 with a 512 bit output (≈ 50µs). The prf is implemented using AES in CTR mode (≈ 2µs). For all these functions we use OpenSSL [60] . The share function is implemented by the sharing primitive introduced by Araki et al. [39] .
Step 2. In this step, the KSMS servers retrieve the car key and perform the corresponding encryption and other subroutines linked to generating the MAC. We consider the following message configuration size: hash(Cert uc ) of 512 bits, ID car of 32 bits, L car of 64 bits, CD uc of 96 bits, AC uc of 8 bits, ID B of 32 bits and σ uo of 512 bits. The booking details M B are of size 768 bits (including padding) and the final access token AT uc is of size 1408 bits (including padding). For the dec function we use RSA with 2048 bit keys (≈ 2ms). The symmetric encryption E is implemented in CTR mode and the mac in CBC mode. As mentioned before, the functions E, mac, and eqz use the basic primitives from Table 2 . Performance of SePCAR, where time is averaged over 1000 runs.
Phase Description
Time (in sec)
Step 1 Sharing the booking details and keys 0.220 ± 0.027 Step 2 Extracting car key and making access token 1.274 ± 0.032
Step 3 Verifying the access token 0.055 (+1 Tor [62] ) Total 1.551 ± 0.043 (+1 Tor)
Araki et al. [39] , and we use the multiparty AES implementation of Damgård and Keller [46] .
Step 2 also includes the MPC. Using Damgård and Keller [46] , a single S-Box evaluation takes 5 communication rounds. A single evaluation of AES consists of 20 sequential evaluations of an S-Box, where we included the key expansion and took into account that parallelizable S-Boxes do not add up to the number of communication rounds, and can thus be encrypted in ν = 100 communication rounds. From (3) we obtain that in our simulation the total number of communication rounds is 5 + 1 + 2 · 100 + 6 · 100 = 806 .
We remark that key expansion for different keys only needs to be performed once, and for multiple evaluations of SePCAR for the same car the round complexity reduces.
Step 3. In this step the consumer retrieves, reconstructs, and verifies the assigned access token. The PL is implemented using SQLite. The implementation of open again follows the basic primitive given by Araki et al. [39] , and mac is implemented using AES in CBC mode (≈ 13µs).
Step 4. The final step consists of a challenge-response protocol between u c and the car, but it does not directly affect the performance of SePCAR and we omit it from our implementation.
Environment Settings. We implemented a realistic simulation for SePCAR in C ++ and evaluated it using a machine equipped with an Intel i7, 2.6Ghz CPU and 8GB of RAM. 5 The communication within the KSMS was simulated using socket calls and latency parameters. We used Araki et al. [39] to simulate the LAN latency (≈ 0.13ms) and Ramamurthy et al. [61] for Wi-Fi (≈ 0.50ms). We did not assume any specific network configuration for our experimentation.
Conclusion
SePCAR is proven to be secure and privacy-enhancing, efficiently performing in ≈ 1.55 seconds for a car access provision. We presented a formal analysis of the security and privacy requirements of our protocol and we provided a prototype as proof-of-concept. As future work, we plan to extend SePCAR to support additional operations such as booking and payment. Fig. 8 . SePCAR complete representation.
